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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Utah corporation 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
F.W. CHAMP, G.H. CHAMP, and 
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN, d/b/a 
CHAMP ASSOCIATES 
Defendants and Respondents 
Supreme Court 
No. 890127 
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APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal filed by Commerce Properties, Inc., plaintiff/ 
appellant, from a final Judgement Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Commerce Properties' claim for a real estate commission due on a lease 
renewal. The date of the Judgment, and the Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Findings of Fact sought to be reviewed was dated March 
14,1989. This appeal from the district court to the Utah Supreme Court 
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was filed April 3,1989 pursuant to section 78-2-2, U.C.A., and Rule 3 of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals via transfer 
of the case by the Utah Supreme Court on May 24,1989, pursuant to Rule 
4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
a. The lower court failed to apply Utah law that a real estate broker 
earned a commission on a lease renewal by procuring a lessee who is 
ready, willing, and able, and who is accepted by the lessor. 
b. The lower court failed to construe the findings of fact and the 
portions of the record most favorable to Commerce Properties in granting 
defendant Champs' motion to dismiss. 
c. The lower court failed to award attorney's fees under the listing 
agreement for appellant having to initiate legal proceedings to collect the 
commission due. 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
"25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and 
subscribed. In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for compensation" 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to collect a real estate brokerage commission due 
under a commission agreement on renewal of a lease of a certain 
industrial property owned by the Champs. The Champs formerly owned 
significant holdings in First Security State Bank and now hold numerous 
properties throughout Salt Lake County. They entered into an exclusive 
6% Sales Agency Contract on January 20,1981 for Commerce Properties to 
act as a real estate broker to locate an up to ten year tenant for one of 
their properties--a 2.38 acre industrial property located at 1422 South 
Redwood Road. Commerce Properties then located Dick Morrison Tire 
Company, Inc. to rent the premises for up to 10 years. On or about August 
6,1981, Commerce Properties agreed to lower their real estate 
commission to facilitate this lease transaction, and entered into a 
Commission Agreement wherein Commerce Properties agreed to only 
accept 6% of the gross rentals for the first five years of the lease, and a 
lessor 3% of the gross rentals if the lease was extended for another five 
years. Commerce Properties then completed the negotiations with Dick 
Morrison Tire Company, Inc. to rent the premises for a minimum rent of 
$477,120.00 over five years commencing August 6,1981 through December 
31,1986, with an option to renew for five years at a minimum rent of 
$594,000.00 commencing January 1,1987 through December 31,1991. 
The Champs paid the 6% commission of $25,461.00 over the first five 
years of the lease. During the term of the original lease, the Champs then 
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elected to directly negotiate with their tenant Dick Morrison Tire 
Company, Inc. to cancel the old lease and enter into a new lease for the 
same five year extension term and at the same rent specified in the 
original lease. The Champs then refused to pay the 3% commission due 
Commerce Properties for locating a ten year tenant to occupy the Champs 
Redwood Road property. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts establish the efforts made by Commerce 
Properties to lease the Champs' industrial premises for 10 years: 
Commerce Properties, Inc. is a Utah corporation licensed to do real 
estate brokering business in the State of Utah (TR. 43). Champ Associates 
is a general partnership consisting of F.W. Champ, G.H. Champ, and Mary 
Champ Nielsen, who own approximately 2.38 acres of certain industrial 
real property locally known as 1422 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (TR 43). 
On or about January 20,1981, Commerce Properties, Inc. and Champ 
Associates entered into a written 6% exclusive listing agreement entitled 
Sales Agency Contract with Commerce Properties, Inc. to locate a tenant 
for their 1422 South Redwood Road Property (Exhibit P-1). The second 
paragraph of the Sales Agency Contract (Exhibit P-1) stated: 
During the life of this contract, if you find a party who is 
ready, able and willing to buy, lease or exchange said property or 
any part thereof, at said price and terms, or any other price or 
terms, to which I may agree in writing, or if said property or any 
part thereof is sold, leased or exchanged during said term by myself 
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or any other party, I agree to pay you a commission of 6% of such 
sale, lease, or exchange. Should said property be sold, leased or 
exchanged within 7 days after such expiration to any party to whom 
the property was offered or shown by me, or you, or any other 
party during the term of this listing, I agree to pay you the 
commission above stated. 
Exhibit P-1 also contained a clause awarding costs of collection and 
attorneys fees in the event legal proceedings were required to collect the 
brokerage commission due. Paragraph 5 of the Sales Agency agreement 
states: 
In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the 
terms of this agreement, I agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee 
and all costs of collection. 
This Sales Agency Agreement was extended on March 11,1981 for another 
three months (Exhibit P-2). 
Pursuant to the listing agreement, Commerce Properties subsequently 
located Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. to occupy and lease the Champs' 
property for up to ten years (TR 44), as well as make approximately 
$125,000.00 in improvements to the property (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR 
55). 
Dick Morrison Tire Company then entered into a five year written 
lease prepared by Commerce Properties, Inc. to lease the Champ 
Associates' property for five years commencing August 6,1981 through 
December 31,1986 at a rent formula which would guarantee the payment 
to the Champs of a minimum of $477,120.00 over the first five year term 
of the lease (Exhibit P-3). The written lease contained an option to renew 
for another five years commencing January 1,1987 through December 31, 
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1991 at a CPI adjusted rent formulae, which would provide the Champs 
approximately $594,000.00 over the second five year term (Exhibit P-3). 
Dick Morrison Tire Company moved onto the leasehold premises and 
made $125,000.00 in improvements for construction of a new retail 
building, conditioned pursuant to paragraph 42(a) of the original lease that 
upon termination of the original five year lease term on December 31, 
1989, Dick Morrison Tire Company was to be paid for said improvements 
the lesser of $10,000.00 or 15% of the improvements it made to the 
leasehold premises (Exhibit No. P-3, Testimony W.F. Champ, TR. 85, 
Deposition Robert Morrison, page 18, line 11, TR.236). 
Reduction of Commission to Facilitate Initial Leasing 
To assist in the leasing of the Champs' property, on or about August 6, 
1981, Commerce Properties, Inc. and Champ Associates entered into a 
Commission Agreement drafted by the Champs' attorney, J. Jay Bullock 
(Exhibit No. P-4, Testimony Robert Rehn, TR-33), reducing the commission 
owed Commerce Properties' for locating Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. 
from 6% of the entire gross lease rentals to approximately 6% of the 
$477,120.00 gross lease rentals to be paid during the first five years of 
the lease amounting to $25,461.00, and 3% of the $594,000.00 gross 
rentals if the original lease was extended another five years, amounting to 
$17,800.00 (Exhibit No. P-4). 
Commerce Properties, Inc. also agreed to be paid the $25,461.00 in 
installments from September 1,1982 through June 1,1983, rather than a 
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lump sum, for the commission due upon execution of the lease for the first 
five year term (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR 44,51). 
Dick Morrison Tire Company has continually occupied the premises and 
paid rents to the Champs from August 6,1981 to the present (Testimony 
W.F. Champ, TR 56,57). 
Dick Morrison Tire Company's Conduct 
Prior to Termination 
Prior to October 31,1986, Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. did not 
tell the Champs it was or was not going to renew the lease (Defendants 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 11). 
Dick Morrison Tire Company in the summer of 1986 did not notify the 
phone company that it was moving to another location, or change its 
telephone number to a new location (Deposition Robert Morrison, pages 28, 
29). 
In the summer and Fall of 1986, Dick Morrison Tire Company did not 
release any advertisements that it was planning to move its facility to 
another location (Deposition Robert Morrison, page 29). 
Commerce' Assistance in Extending the Lease 
Nine months before the expiration of the original lease term, Dick 
Morrison Tire Company, Inc., expanded its operations for its mechanical 
shops and on February 28,1986, entered into a three year lease of 
additional space next to the Champ leasehold premises for $540/month 
(Deposition Robert Morrison, pages 26,27, TR.236). To defer the cost of 
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this additional space, and reduce the burden of the original lease rentals, 
in the Fall of 1986, Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. retained Commerce 
Properties, Inc. to arrange for the U.S. Post Office to sublease a portion of 
the leasehold premises with the Champs for three years, with an option to 
renew for another three years (Deposition Robert Morrison, page 20, 
TR.236 concerning U.S. Postal Service Short Form Lease dated December 2, 
1986, Exhibit No. P-6). 
On or about December 1,1986, the U.S. Post Office subleased 10% of 
the Dick Morrison Tire Company leased premises for three years with an 
option to renew for another three years (TR.32, Plaintiffs Exhibit No. P-6). 
One of the reasons why Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. extended its 
occupancy of the Champs' premises another five years was the rent it 
received from subleasing the premises (deposition Robert Morrison, page 
21, TR.236). 
Q. Was your ability to sublease the premises one of the reasons why you 
entered into a renewal of the, or a new lease with respect to the premises in 
question? 
A. Yes. 
Neither Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc., nor the Champs requested 
Commerce Properties, Inc. to assist in their direct negotiations for an 
extension of the lease, or to renegotiate the terms of a new lease 
(Testimony Robert Rehn, TR 33). 
Lease Extension Negotiated Before Expiration of Lease 
During the Fall of 1986, the Champs were ready and willing for Dick 
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Morrison Tire Company to extend the lease (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR 56, 
67). 
"Q. Let me ask you: Were you willing to extend or were you 
not? 
A. We were very anxious to have Mr. Morrison stay in the 
property; and so we would have been certainly flexible. That was 
our intent. We wanted him to go ahead with it to begin with. 
(TR. 67) 
As part of its negotiating strategy, on October 31,1986, Champ 
Associates notified Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. via letter that it 
refused to accept an extension of the lease because written notice was 
not received before October 1,1986 (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR 64). 
Upon receipt of the October 31,1986 termination letter (Exhibit No. 
P-7), Robert Morrison telephoned F.W. Champ on approximately November 
10,1986 and expressed a desire to remain in the premises and secure a 
new lease (Testimony W.F. Champ TR. 65). The lease term and rentals were 
then immediately agreed upon (TR. 68, 69). 
Q. My question was during that first meeting, did you agree to extend 
occupancy of the premises with Mr. Morrison another five years at the same 
rent? 
A. We really wanted a ten-year lease. 
Q. You wanted a ten-year lease; he wanted a five-year lease. 
A. He didn't want to go any further than five years. 
Q. So you settled~at what time did you agree to the five-year term? 
A. Well, it was during the course of our negotiations. We had extensive 
negotiations in connection with the new lease. 
(TR. 68,69) 
Q. Mr. Champ, with respect to P-7, the enclosed lease refers to a 
five-year term in that draft. 
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And the question I have is: Did you authorize Mr. Bullock to send a 
five-year lease at that time? Was that your instructions, or were you telling 
him to send a ten-year lease? 
A. I am sure that I probably indicated a five-year lease, or I am sure he 
wouldn't have done it. 
Q. So, sometime before November 12 you and Mr. Morrison 
had come to an agreement on a five-year lease; is that fair to say? 
A. Well, that was a starting point. 
(TR. 71,72) 
On November 11,1986, two months prior to the expiration of the 
original lease, F.W. Champ met with J. Jay Bullock regarding the terms of a 
new lease (Testimony W.F. Champ TR 65). One day later on November 12, 
1986, Champ Associates submitted a fifteen page single spaced lease to 
Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. for it to occupy the same premises, for 
the same five year lease term and rentals as that specified in the lease 
option of the original lease, (Testimony W.F. Champ TR. 65, Plaintiffs 
Exhibit No. P-5). Various drafts were then exchanged concerning other 
rental terms before the actual lease drafted by J. Jay Bullock was actually 
signed on January 6,1987 (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR. 76). 
Major Lease Terms Identical 
The major terms of the new lease were identical to those arranged by 
Commerce Properties in the original lease extension. It has: 1) the same 
five year term, and 2) incorporated the same rental formula in the original 
lease option to pay the Champs at least $589,600.00 over the five year 
term (Testimony W.F. Champ TR 73, deposition Robert Morrison, page 31). 
Q. So, after November 12, it was a five-year lease that was going to be 
the term agreed upon. 
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A. This is what we were talking about at that time. 
Q. And the rental formula in both leases was going to be the same? 
A. When you say the rent formula the same, there is a difference in the 
rent abatement in connection with the first month. 
Q. And that you discussed earlier, is that correct, that half-month 
adjustment we were talking about? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So as far as the cost of living escalators and the base 
month rent, those were basically the same as the first lease 
negotiated by Commerce Properties, is that correct? 
A. I believe that's the case. 
(TR.73) 
Parties Recognized Commissions Due 
Paragraph 16 of the new lease contained a right of first refusal if 
Dick Morrison Tire Company elected to purchase the property, wherein the 
Champs agreed to split the real estate commission due Commerce 
Properties, Inc. with Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. (Exhibit No. P-5). 
Upon Alleged Termination 
The Champs treatment of Dick Morrison Tire Company after the 
signing of the new lease documents was virtually identical to that 
required if the original lease had been extended. The Champs did not pay 
Morrison Tire either sum for the improvements made to the property 
(TR.85) as required if the original lease had been terminated after the 
initial five year lease term (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR. 75). 
Q. The question I am asking you is: At the--what you have termed the 
"expiration of the first lease," did you pay any amounts under paragraph 43A to 
Mr. Morrison for the improvements? 
A. No. 
Q. You did not pay the 15% or the $10,000 of any-under the 
paragraph? 
A. That's correct. 
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At the time Dick Morrison Tire Company entered into the original 
lease, it posted an $8,250.00 security deposit, which was to be returned 
on December 31,1986 on termination of the original five year lease 
(Testimony W.F. Champ, TR-86). The Champs did not return the security 
deposit to Dick Morrison Tire Company on December 31,1986 (Testimony 
W.F. Champ (TR-86). 
The Champs did not pay personal property taxes on the fixtures and 
improvements installed on the premises by Robert Morrison Tire Company, 
Inc. after termination of the original lease (Testimony W.F. Champ TR 75). 
Champs Continual Refusal to Pay Commission 
Even though there has been a de facto extension of the old lease, the 
Champs to date have failed and continue to refuse to pay the remaining 
$17,800.00 commission Commerce Properties claims is due for locating a 
ready, willing, and able lessee to occupy the leasehold premises for ten 
years (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR 44,45). 
Commerce Properties expended in excess of $5,000.00 in attorneys 
fees through the trial in its efforts to collect the commission it claims is 
due (Affidavit Marcus G. Theodore, TR. 134). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF EARNED ITS COMMISSION BY FINDING A TEN YEAR 
TENANT AND SHOULD BE PAID 
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The general rule of law in Utah is that a broker has earned a 
commission on procuring a purchaser who is ready, willing, and able, and 
who is accepted by the vendor. The broker is not the insurer of subsequent 
performance of the contract and is not deprived of the right to a 
commission by failure or refusal of the buyer to perform; see Bushnell 
Real Estate. Inc. vs.Nielson. 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983). The right of a 
broker who has procured a tenant for a lessor to recover a commission on a 
renewal, extension, or renegotiations of the lease, where the negotiations 
were made directly between the lessor and lessee, depends upon the 
presence of express contractual provisions for such commission; see Seav 
vs. Bennett & Kahnweiler Associates, etal.. 73 III. App. 3d 945, 392 N.E.2d 
609 (I979). The court in this case stated: 
"...to sustain an action for a broker's commission on a lease 
renewal, the broker must prove that a special agreement 
existed in addition to the initial agreement for securing a 
lessee; that the special agreement between the lessor and the 
broker was reduced to writing; that the lease renewal was 
negotiated under the same terms as the initial lease; or that 
the lease renewal was the result of services performed by the 
broker." 
This same rule was followed in Rosenveld Realty Company vs. Cadence 
Industries Corporation. 75 Misc.2d 634, 348 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1973) where the 
court awarded the real estate commission, and summarized the three 
elements required to prevail as follows: 
"The court in these cases set forth three requirements 
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before a broker would be entitled to commissions on renewals 
of a lease. These are: 1) A special agreement between the 
broker and the lessor. Mullen & Woods. Inc. v. 615 W. 57th 
Street. Inc.. 146 Misc. 599, 262 N.Y.S. 467; 2) Compliance with 
(at that time) former Section 31 of the Personal Property Law 
(now Section 5-701) of the General Obligations Law, known as 
the Statute of Frauds) Allwin Realty Co. vs. Barth. 161 App.Div. 
568, 146 N.Y.S. 960; and 3) That the renewal was for the same 
term and rent. Tracv vs. Albany Exchange Co.. 7 N.Y. 472. The 
courts also stated that in the event of failure to prove "3" there 
must be proof that the renewal was the result of services 
performed by the broker." 
Applying the above standards to the case at hand: 
1) There was a brokerage agreement between Commerce Properties 
and the Champs regarding a commission due on extension of the Dick 
Morrison Tire lease-see Paragraph 3 of the Commission Agreement 
(Exhibit P-3) between Commerce Properties, Inc. and the Champs which 
required the Champs to pay a $17,820.00 commission upon the extension of 
the lease for a five year term with the same lessee of the same property: 
"3. In the event the term of the Lease shall be extended 
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 48 of the Lease, the 
commission payable by the Principal to the Agent upon the 
renewal of the Lease shall be the sum of $17,820.00, computed 
as follows: 
$594,000.00 
x .03 
$ 17,820.00" 
2) The Commission Agreement (Exhibit P-4) was in writing in 
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accordance with the statute of frauds, Section 25-5-4(5), U.C.A., 
1953, as amended; 
3) The renewal was for an identical term according to Robert 
Morrison and the lease documents: 
i. "Q. The new lease is for the same five year term as the 
renewal, is that correct? 
A. Yes." (Deposition Robert Morrison, page 31, TR.36) 
ii. The lease documents are co-terminus--The five year term 
contained in paragraph 2 of the Bullock Lease (Exhibit P-6) began on the 1st 
day of January, 1987 and ended December 31,1991: 
"2. TERM. The term of this Lease shall continue for a 
term of five (5) years, beginning on the 1 st day of January, 
1987, and ending on the 31 st day of December 1991." 
This term is identical to the term contained in Paragraph 48 of the term of 
the original Lease Extension (Exhibit P-3) Paragraph 48 of the original 
Lease states: 
"48. OPTION TO RENEW. Tenant is hereby 
granted an option to renew this lease for one 
additional five-year term, commencing January 1, 
1987, on the same terms and conditions as 
contained in the original lease, ..." 
iii) The rental formulas in both leases are the same, according to the 
above testimony of Robert Morrison and F.W. Champ, and can be seen from a 
comparison of the language in the lease documents: 
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The CPI rental formula in paragraph 48 of the original Lease states: 
"48. OPTION TO RENEW. Tenant is hereby granted an 
option to renew this lease for one additional five-year term, 
commencing January 1, 1987, on the same terms and conditions 
percentage of increase shall be calculated for one-year time as 
contained in the original lease, with the exception of the rental 
amount, which shall be increased by one cent per square foot per 
month per year, or 50% of the Consumer Price Index, whichever 
is greater. The formula for determining the Consumer Price 
Index increase will be based on the percentage increase of the 
Consumer Price Index as published by the U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 911 Walnut Street, Kansas 
City, Missouri, USC Average Revised Urban Wage Earners and 
Clerical Workers. The rental shall be calculated as follows: 
Consumer Price Index (hereinafter referred to as CPI Index) 
shall be obtained for December of the preceding year and Index 
shall be obtained for December of the then current year. The 
percentage increase shall be calculated for one-year time 
periods. The percentage increase shall be reduced to 50% and 
shall be multiplied by the then current amount of monthly rental, 
then added to that base rental. The new figure then will be the 
rental for the next twelve-month period. (Example: 1986 
rental, $8,250 per month - CPI increase 10%. 10% x $8,250 
= $825 x 50% = $412.50 + 8,250 = $8,662.50 = the new 
monthly rental.) However, in the event that the rent (increase 
under the CPI Index formula) is less than one cent per square foot 
per month, the new rent for that year will be increased by one 
cent per square foot per month. The rental for each successive 
year (6-10) shall be computed in this fashion and delivered to 
tenant by landlord at least seven (7) days prior to when the 
rental increase is to take effect. The landlord will provide tenant 
with all supporting documents and calculations to confirm the 
new rental amount. The option to renew this lease shall be 
exercised by written notice delivered by the tenant to the landlord 
on or before October 1, 1986. 
The CPI rental formula contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Bullock 
Lease state: 
3. RENT. The Lessee agrees to pay as rent to the Lessor, 
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at the address specified in this Lease or at such other location as 
Lessor may from time to time designate in writing, the total sum 
of Five Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred and NO/100 
DOLLARS ($589,600.00), without deduction or offset, adjusted 
at the end of each calendar year beginning January 1, 1988, for 
the increase in the Consumer Price Index as set forth in 
Paragraph 4, payable as follows: 
(a) The rent shall be paid on January 1, 1987, for the 
month of January, 1987, shall be Four Thousand Four Hundred 
AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($4,400.00). 
(b) The rent to be paid in February 1, 1987, and each 
month thereafter, shall be equal to the greater, including yearly 
adjustments, of the new rent computed in paragraph 4 using 
$8,800.00 as the rent from the previous adjustment date. 
In the event, Lessee shall fail to pay any rent payable 
under this Lease on the due date or within seven (7) days 
thereafter, a late charge of one percent (1%) per month of the 
delinquent rent shall be added to said rent and paid to the Lessor 
together therewith. 
4. RENT ADJUSTMENT EACH YEAR. Rent shall be 
adjusted for each year ending December 31st to reflect changed in 
the purchasing power of the dollar. As of the first day of the year 
following the effective date of this Lease or the date of the last 
adjustment, the rent payable shall be adjusted to reflect one-half 
(1/2) of the increase in the Consumer Price Index (All Items, 
U.S.) published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United 
States Department of Labor from the previous adjustment date to 
the date of the current adjustment. The adjustment shall be 
computed as follows: 
R = Rent from previous adjustment date. 
C1 = Consumer Price Index at previous adjustment date 
C2 = Consumer Price Index at current adjustment date 
R + R 1/2 (C2 - C1)/C1 = New Rent 
In the event the increase in rent due to increases in the 
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CPI shall be less than one (1) cent per square foot per month, the 
new rent for that year will be increased by one (1) cent per 
square foot per month from the rent for the previous year. The 
Lessor shall notify the Lessee of the new rental amount at least 
seven (7) days prior to January 1 of each year. 
iv. The gross rental receipts projected under both leases are also 
approximately the same--The $589,600.00 gross rentals referred to in 
paragraph 3 of the Bullock lease are virtually identical to the projected 
$594,000.00 gross rentals due under the lease extension: 
Compare paragraph 3 of the Bullock lease Exhibit P-6 which 
states: 
"3. RENT. The Lessee agrees to pay as rent to the Lessor, 
at the address specified in this Lease or at such other location as 
Lessor may from time to time designate in writing, the total sum 
of Five Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred and No/100 
Dollars ($589,600.00)..." 
VS. 
The projected $594,000 projected gross rents calculated in paragraph 
3 of the Broker's Commission Agreement (Exhibit P-4): 
3. In the event the term of the Lease shall be extended 
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 48 of the Lease, the 
commission payable by the Principal to the Agent upon the 
renewal of the Lease shall be the sum of $17,820.00, computed 
as follows: 
$594,000.00 
x .03 
$ 17,820.00 
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In addition, under the Tracy vs. Albany Exchange Co.. 7 N.Y. 472 
criteria, where the renewal was largely the result of services performed 
by Commerce Properties' arrangement for the U.S. Post Office to sublease a 
portion of the Champs' premises, the Champs' received the benefits of 
Commerce Properties' real estate brokering efforts and should pay for the 
same. 
"Q. Was your ability to sublease the premises one of the 
reasons why you entered into a renewal of the, or a new lease 
with respect to the premises in question? 
A. Yes" (Deposition Robert Morrison, page 21, TR. 236) 
The terms payment was to be made under the Commission Agreement 
(Exhibit P-3) must be construed with the performance terms required 
under the original listing agreement (Exhibit P-3). The listing agreement 
incorporated the Bushnell Real Estate. Inc. vs. Nielson standards, supra, 
and state that Commerce Properties was to be paid upon the presentation 
of a lessor who was willing and able to lease the Champs' property for up 
to 10 years. These documents must be construed together under the 
Greaerson vs. Jensen. 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) standard to determine the 
intent of the parties. If there is any ambiguity between the documents, 
they should be construed against the Champs, who had their attorney J. Jay 
Bullock prepare the subsequent agreement, see Seal vs. Tavco. Inc.. 16 
U.2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965). However, inasmuch as the second 
document was executed pursuant to and expressly referred to the original 
listing agreement, the documents should be construed together to reflect 
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the intent of the parties. Commerce Properties would not have expended 
efforts in subleasing a portion of the property to the U.S. Post Office, had 
it known that it would not have been paid for arranging for the underlying 
ten year tenant. 
Damages should therefore be awarded against the Champs for 
improperly manipulating the lease documents with Dick Morrison Tire 
Company in a manner which enabled them to unjustly reap the benefits 
negotiated by Commerce Properties, Inc.; see Hawkins vs. Perrv. 123 U. 16, 
253 P.2d 372 (1953), wherein the Utah Supreme Court imposed a 
constructive trust to prevent one from unjustly profiting through fraud or 
the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship. The Champs had a duty to protect the commission interests 
of Commerce Properties, when they elected to unilaterally negotiate 
directly with Dick Morrison Tire Company for the same rent concessions 
and terms negotiated by Commerce Properties. Their conduct was 
therefore inequitable, and tortuously interfered with the business 
interests of appellants. The lower court's decision should therefore be 
reversed on appeal. 
POINT TWO 
IN THE GRANTING OF RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE FACTS 
MOST FAVORABLY TO APPELLANT 
The lower court failed to construe the findings of fact and the 
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portions of the record most favorably to plaintiff in granting the Champs' 
motion to dismiss, contrary to the requirements of Martin vs. Stevens. 121 
U. 484, 243 P.2d 747(1952); Davis vs Pavne & Dav. Inc.. 10 U.2d 53, 348 
P.2d 337(1960); and Lawrence vs. Bamberger R.R.: 3 U.2d 247, 282 P.2d 
335(1955). Instead, the court entered findings most favorable to the 
Champs. These findings were therefore entered contrary to law, and the 
decision of the lower court should be reversed on appeal. 
POINT THREE 
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES 
As a result of the lower court's improper dismissal of plaintiffs 
cause of action, it also failed to award appellant its attorney's fees 
provided for in its listing agreement (Exhibit P-1) in having to bring this 
action to collect its real estate commission. The lower court therefore 
erred in failing to award appellant its costs and attorney's fees. 
SUMMARY 
The Champs entered into a written commission agreement to pay 
Commerce Properties, Inc. a commission if the five year lease with Dick 
Morrison Tire Company was extended for five years at the same rent rates 
contained therein. Dick Morrison Tire Company subsequently entered into a 
five year lease extension under a separate lease document on substantially 
the same rentals, and for an identical lease term. The Champs should 
therefore pay the $17,800.00 real estate commission for the benefits 
received from Commerce Properties, Inc., which produced a ready, willing, 
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and able ten year lessee, who was accepted by the Champs. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the above facts, the Champs should not be allowed to 
unilaterally manipulate the lease extension documents with their tenant 
and receive the benefit of the brokerage services provided by Commerce 
Properties in locating a ten year tenant at the rentals specified. The 
Champs have received the benefits of a $594,000.00 lease extension from 
a tenant located by Commerce Properties, Inc. They should therefore be 
required to pay the $17,800.00 3% commission due, plus interest, costs, 
and attorney's fees under the Bushnell Real Estate. Inc. vs. Nielson 
standard, above. 
Dated this 2J* day of July, I989. 
Marcus G. Theodore 
Attorney for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of appellant's, 
Commerce Properties, Inc.'s, Brief to the following this ^ / ^ d a v of 
July, 1988: 
Irene Warr, Esq. 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq. 
Suite 280, 311 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
; • » * «^3 ^ C ^ — 
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APPENDIX 
JUDGMENT 
y*T 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES, #736 
IRENE WARR, #3393 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. W. CHAMP, G. H. CHAMP and 
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN d/b/a 
CHAMP ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, sitting without a 
jury, on the 17th day of February, 1989, the plaintiff 
appearing through one of its corporate employees and being 
represented by its attorney, Marcus G. Theodore, Esq., and the 
defendants appearing by and through one of its general 
partners, F. W. (Winton) Champ, and being represented by their 
attorneys, Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq., and Irene Warr, Esq., 
and the Court having taken testimony and received evidence and 
the plaintiff having rested its case and the defendants having 
made a motion to dismiss for failure of the plaintiffs to prove 
a claim upon which relief could be granted based upon the 
record and evidence adduced by it, and the parties having 
submitted written memoranda to the Court,and the Court being 
MAR 1 't «89 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 8802446 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
fully advised in the premises, and the Court having made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based thereon it 
is: 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 
That Plaintiff's complaint be and the same is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and that defendants are granted 
judgment of no cause of action and are entitled to their costs. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this /7* day of February, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
Plaintiff's Last Known Address: 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the^th day of February, 
1989, the undersigned caused a copy of the foregoing Judgment 
to be served upon the plaintiff by depositing a copy of the 
same into the United States Mail, postage prepaid and 
addressed to: 
Marcus G. Theodore, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
275 East South Temple, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
This Judgment is forwarded to the above party pursuant 
to Rule 4.504 Rules of Judicial Administration and any 
o 
objection as to said Judgment should be made within five 
• • - ? / 
(5) days of date of service, / /
 ys 
~<& s^^Zz* 
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PAUL N. COTRO-MANES, #736 
IRENE WARR, #3393 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. W. CHAMP, G. H. CHAMP and 
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN d/b/a 
CHAMP ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff's motion to amend findings of fact came 
on for hearing on the 14th day of March, 1989, at the hour 
of 9:45 o'clock, a.m., the plaintiff appearing by and through 
its attorney Marcus G. Theodore, Esq. and the defendants 
appearing by and through one of their attorneys, Paul N. 
Cotro-Manes, Esq., and the Court having ordered that the 
plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and the Objections to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law filed on the 2nd day of March be deemed a 
motion to amend defendants Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, which order was based upon the stipulation of the parties, 
and the matter having been argued to the Court and submitted to 
MAR 2 3 1989 
Clerk 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS 
OF FACT 
Civil No. C 8802446 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
it for decision, and the Court having restated its findings and 
conclusions which were in conformity with the defendants1 
proposed findings and conclusions, and the Court being fully 
advised in the pemises, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 
That the plaintiff's motion to amend findings of fact 
and conclusions of law is denied, 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this<-^[_day of March, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
fiX^fy^-rJ^ 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 14th day of March', 
1989, the undersigned caused a copy of the foregoing Order 
to be served upon the plaintiff by depositing a copy of the 
same into the United States Mail, postage prepaid and 
addressed to: 
Marcus G. Theodore, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
275 East South Temple, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
This Order is forwarded to the above party pursuant 
to Ruls 4.504 Rules of Judicial Administration and any 
objection as to said Order should be made within five 
(5) days of date of service. 
APPEAL 
CM cn 
' ^ T 
Marcus G. Theodore #3224 
Attorney for Commerce Properties, Inc. 
275 East South Temple, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 80I-359-8622 
^ 
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 r ^ IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
\ » 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC. 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
F.W. CHAMP, G.H. CHAMP, and 
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN d/b/a 
CHAMP ASSOCIATES 
Defendants 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C-88-02446 
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Pursuant to 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, notice is hereby given that 
plaintiff, Commerce Properties, Inc., hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the 
Judgment entered in this action on March 14,1989, and the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact entered March 14,1989. 
Dated this 3rd day of April, I989. 
- J&i- ^ -
Marcus G. Theodore, Attorney for Appellant 
275 East South Temple, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(80I) 359-8622 
STATUTE 
25-5-4 FRAUD 
plicable where the alleged acts of part perfor-
mance were not referable to the alleged oral 
contract to sell land. McDonald v. Barton Bros. 
Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981). 
The doctrine of partial performance was not 
applicable where all of the acts alleged were 
not exclusively referable to the alleged oral 
modification of a construction and lease agree-
ment. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 
P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
—Evidence. 
Purchaser of land under an oral contract 
seeking to avoid the statute of frauds under the 
doctrine of part performance, based upon his 
possession of the land and improvements 
thereon, must establish that possession was ac-
tual, open, exclusive and with the seller's con-
sent; improvements made were substantial, 
valuable and beneficial; a valuable consider-
ation was given in exchange for the convey-
ance; and all of the foregoing was exclusively 
referable to the contract. Coleman v. Dillman, 
624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981). 
To meet the part performance exception to 
the statute of frauds, the terms of the oral con-
tract must be established by clear and definite 
evidence. Bradshaw v. McBnde, 649 P2d 74 
(Utah 1982). 
Promissory estoppel. 
The elements of promissory estoppel neces-
sary to preclude the operation of this section 
were not present in a case where a lessee and a 
man claiming to be the lessor entered into an 
oral agreement for the lease of property and 
the lease was to be reduced to writing by the 
lessor but was never written because the lessor 
learned of a defect in the chain of title. The 
lessee moved on the property and then brought 
action against the claimed lessor. The lessee 
did not expend any moneys upon the leased 
premises, but was damaged because of the loss 
of a good bargain. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 
386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956). 
Recovery upon quantum meruit or theory 
of unjust enrichment. 
Where defendant owner entered into oral 
agreement to sell described land to plaintiff at 
specified price, which was void under this sec-
tion, and plaintiff thereafter entered into con-
tract to sell same land to third person at profit, 
but, when defendant learned of latter contract, 
he refused to sell to plaintiff and sold land to 
third person for same amount that latter had 
agreed to pay plaintiff, plaintiff was not enti-
tled to recover on theory of unjust enrichment 
for value of his services in procuring pur-
chaser, even in absence of § 25-5-4(5). Baugh 
v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P2d 335 (1947). 
Sale defined. 
As applied to land, the word "sale" implies 
the creation of an estate in excess of a lease-
hold, by the act of the owner. Lewis v. Dahl, 
108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362, 160 A.L.R. 1040 
(1945). 
Settling of accounts. 
Defense that agreement by wife to convey 
ranch to former husband and herself jointly 
was not in writing and thereby void was not 
invocable in equity proceedings of settling ac-
counts between the parties where ranch had 
been sold and court was concerned only with 
distribution of proceeds. Corbet v. Corbet, 24 
Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970). 
Subscription. 
A document to be enforceable under the stat-
ute of frauds must be subscribed by the party 
granting the conveyance. Williams v. Single-
ton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). 
Surrender, release or discharge. 
Surrender of interest under contract for pur-
chase of land could be properly effected without 
a deed or conveyance in writing m compliance 
with this statute. Budge v. Barron, 51 Utah 
234, 169 P. 745 (1917). 
Termination or rescission of contract. 
An agreement to terminate or rescind a con-
tract must be in writing, if the contract that is 
extinguished falls within the statute of frauds. 
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 
105 (Utah 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of 
Frauds § 59 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of *» 71 
et seq. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and sub-
scribed. 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to 
be charged therewith: 
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS 25-5-4 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
another. 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration 
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry. 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to 
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or 
intestate out of his own estate. 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for compensation. 
History: R-S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2467; L. 
1909, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5817; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 33-5-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Accord and satisfaction. 
Affirmative defense. 
Alteration or modification of original contract. 
Assignments. 
Brokerage contracts. 
—Action by broker. 
—Finder's agreement. 
—Fully executed contracts. 
—Procuring lessee. 
—Procuring option. 
—Subscription. 
City council minutes. 
Contract not to be performed within a year. 
—Automobile rental. 
Contract to make will. 
Evidence. 
—Proving nature of agreement. 
Part performance. 
Promise to recover for another's debt or de-
fault. 
—Promisor's own purposes served. 
Recovery upon quantum meruit. 
Revocation or release of agreement to answer 
for debt of another. 
Stipulation. 
Unilateral contracts. 
Accord and satisfaction. 
Although it is well settled in Utah that if an 
original agreement is within the statute of 
frauds, a subsequent modifying agreement 
must also satisfy the statute of frauds, an ac-
cord and satisfaction is something entirely dif-
ferent and need not be in writing, even if the 
original contract was within the statute of 
frauds. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 
P.2d 730 (Utah 1985). 
Affirmative defense. 
When an action is on a contract, admitted by 
defendant, he must interpose a special plea of 
this statute if statute is to be available as a 
defense. Abba v. Smyth, 21 Utah 109,59 P. 756 
(1899). 
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party 
relying upon it as a defense. M & S Constr. & 
Eng*g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 19 Utah 2d 
86, 426 P.2d 227 (1967). 
Defendant, who answered by a general de-
nial and simultaneous motion to dismiss plain-
tiffs claim as being barred under Subsection 
(2) of this section, proceeded improperly, since 
under Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, statute of frauds is not a ground for mo-
tion to dismiss but rather an affirmative de-
fense under Rule 8(c). W.W. & W.B. Gardner, 
Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 
(1970). 
Alteration or modification of original con-
tract. 
If original contract, to be binding and en-
forceable, and to satisfy the statute of frauds, is 
required to be in writing and subscribed by 
parties sought to be charged, then a subse-
quent agreement altering or modifying any of 
its material parts or terms is also required to 
be in writing and so subscribed, no part perfor-
mance or anything done by such party in reli-
ance on the subsequent agreement being al-
leged or proved, especially if interest in land is 
involved. Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 71 
Utah 535, 267 P. 1020 (1928). 
Parties may modify orally an agreement in 
writing where the original contract is not re-
quired by the statute of frauds to be in writing, 
at least where there is consideration for such 
modification. But a contract required by the 
statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be 
modified by a subsequent oral agreement, al-
though this rule is subject to many exceptions, 
the first great division coming between execu-
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